Licensing to a durable-good duopoly in patent litigation
Licensing to a durable-good duopoly in patent litigation
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DOI：
10.1016/j.econmod.2010.12.004
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发表时间：
2010-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Xue Ming-gao;Su Li-li
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Xue Ming-gao;Su Li-li
将专利诉讼纳入耐用良好的双头垄断模型中，我们重新审视了关于降低成本的创新的最优许可合同。我们发现，最优许可合同和创新者的许可收入都与专利的实力密切相关，即如果在法庭上测试，专利被发现有效的概率。研究表明，对于相对较弱的专利(专利强度较低)，创新者收取尽可能高的使用费和负的固定费用是最优的。但对于相对较强的专利(专利强度较高)，采用中等水平的使用费和正固定费用相结合的合同是最优的。我们还讨论了专利的强弱如何影响专利的社会福利。最后，我们提出了两点政策建议，以缓解弱势专利许可所带来的社会福利损失。
Incorporating patent litigation into a durable-good duopoly model, we revisit the optimal licensing contract on a cost-reducing innovation. We find that both the optimal licensing contract and the innovator's licensing revenue are closely related to the patent's strength, i.e., the probability it would be found valid if tested in court. It is shown that, for a relatively weak patent (patent's strength is low), it's optimal for the innovator to charge the royalty rate as high as possible coupled with a negative fixed fee. But for a relatively strong patent (patent's strength is high), contract involving the combination of a medium level royalty rate and a positive fixed fee is optimal. We also discuss how the patent's strength affects the social welfare of a patent. Finally we present two policy suggestions that may alleviate the social welfare loss raised by the licensing of weak patents.