Proportionality, Contrast and Explanation
Proportionality, Contrast and Explanation
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比例、对比和解释
DOI：
10.1080/00048402.2013.788045
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Brad Weslake
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Brad Weslake
如果反事实依赖足以作为因果关系，如果遗漏可以成为原因，那么所有事件都有比常识倾向于认识到的更多的原因。这个问题通常是通过诉诸语用学来解决的。然而，Carolina Sartorio[2010]最近提出了一个更有趣的问题，我认为这是一个更有趣的问题，涉及到对反事实因果关系理论的省略--更有趣的是，它需要一个更微妙的务实解决方案。我讨论了原因与其结果成正比的观点，因果是对比的观点，以及因果解释应该相互评估的维度之间的关系。
If counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation and if omissions can be causes, then all events have many more causes than common sense tends to recognize. This problem is standardly addressed by appeal to pragmatics. However, Carolina Sartorio [2010] has recently raised what I shall argue is a more interesting problem concerning omissions for counterfactual theories of causation—more interesting because it demands a more subtle pragmatic solution. I discuss the relationship between the idea that causes are proportional to their effects, the idea that causation is contrastive, and the question of the dimensions along which causal explanations should be evaluated with respect to one another.
影响因子：
1.7
作者：
Waldmann, Michael R.;Meder, Bjoern;von Sydow, Momme;Hagmayer, York
通讯作者：
Hagmayer, York