Differential Game Models of Global Environmental Management
Differential Game Models of Global Environmental Management
复制标题
全球环境管理的微分博弈模型
DOI：
10.1007/978-1-4612-0841-9_1
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发表时间：
1995
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
G. Zaccour
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Haurie;G. Zaccour
本文研究了几个国家的经济与环境相互作用的模型，假设这些国家在控制本国经济过程方面表现出竞争性，但必须共同实现共同的环境管理目标。本文分为两部分，分别处理与过程动态和参与者交互相关的建模问题。在第一部分中，我们讨论在环境管理模型中表示经济和污染过程的控制理论方法。我们还对这些模型中不确定性和风险的可能表示进行了简短讨论。在第二部分中，我们提出了一种动态博弈建模方法，该方法结合了两种经典模型，即Rosen提出的耦合约束的N人均衡模型和Brock提出的具有主动和被动变量的微分博弈模型。这些模型允许定义税收计划，该计划诱导一系列寻求均衡的参与者，从长远来看，实现全球环境目标。
This paper deals with the modeling of economy-environment interactions for several countries which are assumed to behave competitively for the control of their own economic processes but have to achieve jointly a common environmental management goal. The paper is organized in two parts treating of modeling issues related to process dynamics and players interactions respectively. In the first part we discuss the control theoretic approach for representing the economic and pollution processes in a model of environmental management. We also give a short discussion of a possible representation of uncertainty and risk in these models. In part two we propose a dynamic game modeling approach which combines two classic models, the N-person equilibrium model with coupled constraints proposed by Rosen and the differential game model with active and passive variables proposed by Brock. These models permit the definition of a tax scheme which induces a set of equilibrium seeking players to achieve, in the long run, a global environmental goal.