Congressional Representation: Accountability from the Citizen's Perspective

Congressional Representation: Accountability from the Citizen's Perspective
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国会代表:公民视角下的责任

DOI:
10.1111/ajps.12607
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发表时间:
2021
影响因子:
4.2
通讯作者:
Ansolabehere, Stephen Kuriwaki
Ansolabehere, Stephen Kuriwaki
中科院分区:
法学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Ansolabehere, Stephen Kuriwaki

文献摘要

相似文献

选民要求代表对他们的立法决定负责这一前提支撑了民主政治理论和成文法解释的法律的理论。但在个人层面上的研究很少,只研究了少数几个问题,得出的结果好坏参半。我们在个人层面上对问题问责性进行了广泛的评估。我们追踪了七届国会(2006- 2018)对44项法案的唱名表决,并将其与选民对其代表投票的看法及其对代表的评价联系起来。相关性、工具变量和实验方法都表明,选民对代表负责。一个标准差的增加,在一个组成部分的感知问题协议与他们的代表可以提高净批准35个百分点。然而,国会选区是异质的。因此,在地区一级,议题协议对投票的影响要小得多,解决了微观和宏观研究之间的明显差异。
The premise that constituents hold representatives accountable for their legislative decisions undergirds political theories of democracy and legal theories of statutory interpretation. But studies of this at the individual level are rare, examine only a handful of issues, and arrive at mixed results. We provide an extensive assessment of issue accountability at the individual level. We trace the congressional roll‐call votes on 44 bills across seven Congresses (2006–18), and link them to constituent's perceptions of their representative's votes and their evaluation of their representative. Correlational, instrumental variables, and experimental approaches all show that constituents hold representatives accountable. A one‐standard deviation increase in a constituent's perceived issue agreement with their representative can improve net approval by 35 percentage points. Congressional districts, however, are heterogeneous. Consequently, the effect of issue agreement on vote is much smaller at the district level, resolving an apparent discrepancy between micro and macro studies.