Exploration externalities and government subsidies: The return to government
Exploration externalities and government subsidies: The return to government
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DOI：
10.1016/j.resourpol.2016.01.002
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发表时间：
2016-03-01
期刊：
影响因子：
10.2
通讯作者：
Sagerer, Simon
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Fogarty, James J.;Sagerer, Simon
长期以来，各国政府一直投资于直接提供基本地质调查资料，以支持勘探和采矿活动。最近，澳大利亚政府也开始向勘探公司提供直接的钻探补贴。利用西澳大利亚州的数据，我们调查了直接提供地质调查信息和提供钻井补贴给政府的回报。我们没有发现任何证据表明，在给政府带来回报方面，钻探补贴不如传统地质调查支出有效。我们认为钻井补贴是有效的，因为在勘探股权资本市场中存在不诚实的外部性，导致了市场柠檬问题，而政府向勘探公司提供钻井补贴的计划作为第三方认证系统解决了这一问题。我们得出的结论是，在实际贴现率为5%、7%和9%的情况下，加上对收益的狭义定义，州政府支持勘探的预期收益成本比分别为9.0、6.7和5.2。(C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd.版权所有。
Governments have, for a long time, invested in the direct provision of basic geological survey information to support exploration and mining activity. Recently, Australian governments have also started to provide direct drilling subsidies to exploration companies. Using data for Western Australia we investigate the return to government from the direct provision of geological survey information and the provision of drilling subsides. We find no evidence that drilling subsidies are less effective than traditional geological survey spending in generating a return to government. We suggest drilling subsidies are effective because there is a dishonesty externality in the market for exploration equity capital that gives rise to a market for lemons problem, and that government programs to award drilling subsidies to exploration companies work as a third party certification system that addresses this problem. We conclude by showing that, with real discount rates of 5%, 7%, and 9%, and a narrow definition of benefits, the expected benefit-cost ratios for State government support for exploration are 9.0, 6.7, and 5.2. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.