Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence
Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence
复制标题
民选监管者与任命监管者：理论与证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
T. Besley
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Stephen Coate;T. Besley
本文对比了直接选举和政治任命监管机构。当监管机构被任命时，监管政策就与任命官员的政治家负责的其他政策问题捆绑在一起。由于监管问题对大多数选民来说并不突出，监管政策的结果反映了政党精英和特殊利益集团的偏好。直接选举监管机构通过确保监管问题的突出性来加强选民的权力。使用来自美国各州的监管结果的面板数据，我们发现了有利于民选州在监管政策中更亲消费者的证据。
This paper contrasts direct election with political appointment of regulators. When regulators are appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled with other policy issues the appointing politicians are responsible for. Since regulatory issues are not salient for most voters, regulatory policy outcomes reflect the preferences of party elites and special interests. Direct election of regulators strengthens the power of voters by ensuring the salience of regulatory issues. Using panel data on regulatory outcomes from U.S. states, we find evidence in favor of the idea that elected states are more pro-consumer in their regulatory policies.