Buyer Uncertainty About Seller Capacity: Causes, Consequences, and a Partial Solution
Buyer Uncertainty About Seller Capacity: Causes, Consequences, and a Partial Solution
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买方对卖方能力的不确定性：原因、后果和部分解决方案
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3155526
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Horton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Horton
在线劳动力市场上的雇主往往追求的是没有多少能力承担更多工作的工人。对低产能工人的追求具有重要意义，因为这些工人更有可能拒绝雇主的询问，导致职位空缺最终得到填补的可能性降低。为了将更多雇主的注意力转移到能力更大的工人身上，本文研究的市场设计平台在市场中引入了一种新的信号功能。它是有效的，因为当一名工人发出拥有高能力的信号时，他或她会收到更多来自雇主的邀请，拒绝这些邀请的比例较小，报价较低的工作价格，更有可能被聘用。粗略的计算表明，通过增加匹配数量和帮助将项目分配给成本较低的工人，仅信号发送功能就可以将市场过剩增加高达6%。这篇论文被Lorin Hitt，信息系统公司接受。
Employers in an online labor market often pursue workers with little capacity to take on more work. The pursuit of low-capacity workers is consequential, as these workers are more likely to reject employer inquires, causing a reduction in the probability that a job opening is ultimately filled. In an attempt to shift more employer attention to workers with greater capacity, the market-designing platform examined in this paper introduced a new signaling feature into the market. It was effective, in that when a worker signaled having high capacity, he or she received more invitations from employers, rejected a smaller fraction of those invitations, quoted lower prices to do the work, and was more likely to be hired. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests the signaling feature alone could increase market surplus by as much as 6%, both by increasing the number of matches formed and by helping to allocate projects to workers with lower costs. This paper was accepted by Lorin Hitt, information systems.