What eliminative materialism isn’t
What eliminative materialism isn’t
复制标题
消除唯物主义不是什么
DOI：
10.1007/s11229-021-03309-y
复制
发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
W. Ramsey
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
W. Ramsey
在这篇文章中，我的目的是更清楚地了解消除唯物主义实际上意味着什么，而不是什么。我仔细观察了当代哲学和认知科学中经常被描述为消除主义形式的一组观点，并试图表明这种定性是错误的。更具体地说，我研究了最近被爱德华·马赫里(Edouard Machery)(2009)、保罗·格里菲斯(Paul Griffiths)(1997)、瓦莱丽·哈德卡斯尔(Valerie HardCastle)(1999)等人支持的消除主义概念，并辩称，尽管这些观点确实支持消除某些东西，但它们只提供了我将称之为一种范畴消解的东西，应该被视为与传统的消除主义完全不同的东西。阐明消除唯物主义本身和这种另类观点之间的主要对比(S)，并捍卫保持它们不同的必要性，是我的主要目标。正如我所展示的，一个核心的讽刺是，问题观点的支持者经常坚持认为，不同的东西不应该被归类在一个单一的标签下。通过将自己的观点描述为一种消除主义的形式，他们犯了一个根本性的错误，他们自己认为不应该犯这个错误。虽然我在这里的重点是消除唯物主义，但我想要强调的错误出现在关于所谓的各种事物的消除主义的各种讨论中。
In this paper my aim is to get clearer on what eliminative materialism actually does and does not entail. I look closely at one cluster of views that is often described as a form of eliminativism in contemporary philosophy and cognitive science and try to show that this characterization is a mistake. More specifically, I look at conceptions of eliminativism recently endorsed by writers such as Edouard Machery (2009), Paul Griffiths (1997), Valerie Hardcastle (1999) and others, and argue that although these views do endorse the elimination of something, they offer only what I will call a sort of category dissolution, and should be treated as something altogether different from traditional eliminativism. Spelling out the main contrast(s) between eliminative materialism proper and this alternative view, and defending the need to keep them distinct, is my primary objective. As I show, a central irony is that proponents of the problematic outlook often insist that divergent things should not be classified together under a single label. By characterizing their own views as a form of eliminativism, they commit a fundamental error that they themselves argue should not be made. While my focus here is on eliminative materialism, the error I intend to highlight appears across various discussions about alleged eliminativism of all sorts of things.