Linking program implementation and effectiveness: Lessons from a pooled sample of welfare-to-work experiments
Linking program implementation and effectiveness: Lessons from a pooled sample of welfare-to-work experiments
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DOI：
10.1002/pam.10154
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发表时间：
2003-09-01
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
Riccio, JA
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bloom, HS;Hill, CJ;Riccio, JA
本文解决的问题是：实施如何影响强制性工作福利计划的有效性？对3个大型、多地点随机分配实验的数据进行汇总；构建了项目实施的量化指标；并采用多层次统计模型来检验项目实施与短期客户收益影响之间的关系。分析了69,399名样本成员的个人层面数据，分析了59个地方项目的群体层面实施数据。研究结果表明，在其他条件相同的情况下，通过以下方式增加收益效应：强调客户快速就业，强调个性化客户关注，员工案件量不要太大，以及限制基础教育的使用。研究结果还表明，强制性的工作福利计划对许多类型的人都是有效的，而把重点放在那些特别准备好工作（或不准备工作）的客户身上，并没有对计划的有效性产生一致的影响。(C) 2003年，公共政策分析与管理协会。
This paper addresses the question: How does implementation influence the effectiveness of mandatory welfare-to-work programs? Data from three large-scale, multi-site random assignment experiments were pooled; quantitative measures of program implementation were constructed; and multilevel statistical modeling was used to examine the relationship between program implementation and effects on short-term client earnings. Individual-level data were analyzed for 69,399 sample members and group-level implementation data were analyzed for 59 local programs. Findings indicate that, other things being equal, earnings effects are increased by: an emphasis on quick client employment, an emphasis on personalized client attention, staff caseloads that do not get too large, and limited use of basic education. Findings also show that mandatory welfare-to-work programs can be effective for many types of people, and that focusing on clients who are especially job-ready (or not) does not have a consistent influence on a program's effectiveness. (C) 2003 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.