Capital Market Frictions and Deposit Constraints at Banks
Capital Market Frictions and Deposit Constraints at Banks
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资本市场摩擦与银行存款限制
DOI：
10.2307/2601093
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Donald P. Morgan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jith Jayaratne;Donald P. Morgan
根据投资现金流文献，我们检验银行贷款是否受到有保险存款的限制--这是货币政策银行贷款渠道存在的必要条件。我们把有保险的存款视为一种“内部资金”，类似于现金流。我们使用一个简单的模型来梳理在解释贷款和存款增长之间的相关性时可能存在的识别问题，包括反向因果关系和省略变量偏差。为了使后者最小化，我们控制贷款需求；我们使用托宾Q和其他代理。我们还根据资本比率对样本进行了划分，假设资本市场上的银行面临的摩擦对资本不足的银行来说应该是最严重的。这一结果与银行面临的资本市场摩擦的存在是一致的，并表明这种摩擦在银行贷款供应和有担保存款的供应之间形成了联系。这些摩擦似乎只对小银行有影响，这表明银行贷款渠道的潜力是有限的。
Following the investment-cash flow literature, we test whether bank lending is constrained by the availability of insured deposits--a necessary condition for the existence of a bank lending channel of monetary policy. We treat insured deposits as a type of "internal fund," similar to cash flows. We use a simple model to sort out the possible identification issues in interpreting the correlation between lending and deposit growth, including reverse causality and omitted-variable bias. To minimize the latter, we control for loan demand; we use Tobin's Q and other proxies. We also split the sample by capital ratios under the assumption that the frictions facing banks in capital markets should be most severe for poorly capitalized banks. The results are consistent with the existence of frictions in capital markets facing banks, and show that such frictions forge a link between the supply of bank loans and the supply of insured deposits. The frictions seem to matter only at small banks, suggesting that the potential for a bank lending channel is limited.