Tax Smoothing in Frictional Labor Markets: A Comment

Tax Smoothing in Frictional Labor Markets: A Comment
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摩擦性劳动力市场中的税收平滑:评论

DOI:
10.1086/722413
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发表时间:
2022
影响因子:
8.2
通讯作者:
Mehrab Kiarsi
Mehrab Kiarsi
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Mehrab Kiarsi

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在一个校准的匹配模型中,根据政府失业转移的高值和工人议价权重的低值,可以解释美国劳动力市场的波动,阿尔索和丘格(2012)定量地发现,拉姆齐最优政策要求极端的劳动税波动,并且“美国实际的税收政策产生了过于平滑的劳动力税率,导致了次优的劳动力市场波动”(928)。本文通过在外生政策模型中加入空缺补贴来完善税制,从而得出这一结果。它声称,拉姆齐规划者使用高度不稳定的税收,通过随着时间的推移保持静态楔形恒定和跨期楔形为零,来诱导劳动力市场的有效波动。文章还声称,实现零跨期失真是拉姆齐规划者最关心的问题,对全额股息税的假设不敏感。在这篇文章中,我对Arseau和Chugh(2012)中的Ramsey问题进行了解析解,并证明了,在内部稳态解的情况下,跨期Ramsey解与社会规划问题的解是相同的。对于Arseau和Chugh(2012)提供的参数值,我证明了不存在这样的内部稳态解。相反,社会规划者和拉姆齐的最优都是在角落里实现的,在那里找到工作的可能性是100%。在Arseau和Chugh(2012)中,量化结果是在假设
In a calibrated matching model that, conditional on a high value for government unemployment transfers and a low value for workers’ bargaining weight, can account for US labor market volatility, Arseneau and Chugh (2012) quantitatively find that the Ramsey optimal policy calls for extreme labor tax volatility and that “actual US tax policy has produced too smooth a labor tax rate, resulting in suboptimally large labor market volatility”(928). The article obtains this result after adding a vacancy subsidy to the exogenous policy model to make the tax system complete. It claims that the Ramsey planner uses highly volatile taxes to induce efficient fluctuations in the labor market by keeping static wedges constant and intertemporal wedges at zero over time. The article also claims that achieving zero intertemporal distortion is the paramount concern of the Ramsey planner and insensitive to the assumption of full dividend taxation. In this paper, I analytically solve for the Ramsey problem in Arseneau and Chugh (2012) and show that, in the case of an interior steady-state solution, the intertemporal Ramsey solution is the same as the solution to the social planning problem. For the parameter values provided by Arseneau and Chugh (2012), I show that there is no such interior steady-state solution. Rather, both the social planner and Ramsey optimum is achieved at the corner, where the job-finding probability is 100%. In Arseneau and Chugh (2012), the quantitative results are reported under the assumption that the