Tax Smoothing in Frictional Labor Markets: A Comment
Tax Smoothing in Frictional Labor Markets: A Comment
复制标题
摩擦性劳动力市场中的税收平滑:评论
DOI:
10.1086/722413
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发表时间:
2022
影响因子:
8.2
通讯作者:
Mehrab Kiarsi
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Mehrab Kiarsi
In a calibrated matching model that, conditional on a high value for government unemployment transfers and a low value for workers’ bargaining weight, can account for US labor market volatility, Arseneau and Chugh (2012) quantitatively find that the Ramsey optimal policy calls for extreme labor tax volatility and that “actual US tax policy has produced too smooth a labor tax rate, resulting in suboptimally large labor market volatility”(928). The article obtains this result after adding a vacancy subsidy to the exogenous policy model to make the tax system complete. It claims that the Ramsey planner uses highly volatile taxes to induce efficient fluctuations in the labor market by keeping static wedges constant and intertemporal wedges at zero over time. The article also claims that achieving zero intertemporal distortion is the paramount concern of the Ramsey planner and insensitive to the assumption of full dividend taxation. In this paper, I analytically solve for the Ramsey problem in Arseneau and Chugh (2012) and show that, in the case of an interior steady-state solution, the intertemporal Ramsey solution is the same as the solution to the social planning problem. For the parameter values provided by Arseneau and Chugh (2012), I show that there is no such interior steady-state solution. Rather, both the social planner and Ramsey optimum is achieved at the corner, where the job-finding probability is 100%. In Arseneau and Chugh (2012), the quantitative results are reported under the assumption that the