Rethinking Japan's Bad Loan Management: Implications from a Comparison with the Swedish Case
Rethinking Japan's Bad Loan Management: Implications from a Comparison with the Swedish Case
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反思日本的不良贷款管理：与瑞典案例比较的启示
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kenji Suzuki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kenji Suzuki
日本和北欧国家在20世纪90年代初同样经历了泡沫经济的严重崩溃，但前者的金融复苏相对于后者而言极为滞后。在日本，财务省经常受到指责，称其行为过于武断。人们的假设是，基于与银行和政治家的密切联系，它在政策制定过程中一直拥有或至少直到最近一直拥有过于强大的权力。然而，相关行为体之间的密切联系也可能缩小其业绩范围。如果将政策制定过程概念化为连接相关公共/私人行为者的网络，那么日本金融当局就被视为“陷入”了与网络中其他行为者的粘性关系之中。正如社会网络和社会学习的文献中所指出的那样，过于紧密和过于封闭的联系可能会恶化网络中行动者的学习能力，部分原因是他们的行动往往受到限制，部分原因是他们往往从外部获得较少的信息。这一理论似乎得到了日本和瑞典证据的有力支持。
Japan and the Nordic countries similarly experienced a serious collapse of the Bubble economy in the early 1990s, but the financial recovery of the former is extremely delayed compared with the latter. In Japan, the Ministry of Finance is often accused of this, with the claim that it has acted too arbitrarily. The assumption is that it has held, or had held at least until recently, excessively strong power in the policy-making process, based on the close connection with banks and politicians. However, the close connection between relevant actors may also reduce the scope of their performance. If the policy-making process is conceptualized as the network linking relevant public/ private actors, the Japanese financial authorities are rather seen as “trapped” into sticky relations with other actors in the network. As suggested in the literature of social network and social learning, too close and too closed connections may deteriorate the learning competence of the actors in the network, partly because their action tends to be restricted and partly because they tend to get less information from outside. This theory seems to be strongly supported by the evidence of Japan and Sweden.