Regulatory competition in capital standards: a ‘race to the top’ result
Regulatory competition in capital standards: a ‘race to the top’ result
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资本标准的监管竞争:争夺最高结果的竞赛
DOI:
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.06.001
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发表时间:
2019
影响因子:
3.7
通讯作者:
Andreas
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Haufler;Andreas
Several countries have recently introduced national capital standards exceeding the internationally coordinated Basel III rules, which is inconsistent with the ‘race to the bottom’ in capital standards found in the literature. We study regulatory competition when banks are heterogeneous and give loans to firms that produce output in an integrated market. In this setting capital requirements change the pool quality of banks in each country and inflict negative externalities on neighboring jurisdictions by shifting risks to foreign taxpayers and by reducing total credit supply and output. Non-cooperatively set capital standards are higher than coordinated ones, and a ‘race to the top’ results, when governments care equally about bank profits, taxpayers, and consumers.
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