Board Composition and Corporate Control: Evidence from the Insurance Industry
Board Composition and Corporate Control: Evidence from the Insurance Industry
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董事会组成和公司控制：来自保险业的证据
DOI：
10.1086/209707
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发表时间：
1997
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Clifford W. Smith
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Mayers;Anil Shivdasani;Clifford W. Smith
作者通过利用保险业内部所有权结构的变化来研究外部董事在公司控制过程中的作用。在互助中，所有权不可转让。这种不可分割性限制了外部收购等控制机制的有效性，从而增加了外部董事监督的重要性。与这一假设相一致的是，作者发现互助公司聘用的外部董事多于股票；在股票和共同性质之间转换的公司在董事会组成上做出相应的改变；互助公司的章程更频繁地规定外部董事的参与；外部董事越多的互助机构在工资、工资和租金方面的支出就越低。版权所有 1997 芝加哥大学出版社。
The authors investigate the role of outside directors in the corporate-control process by exploiting variation in ownership structure within the insurance industry. In mutuals, ownership rights are not transferable. This inalienability restricts the effectiveness of control mechanisms like external takeovers, thus increasing the importance of monitoring by outside directors. Consistent with this hypothesis, the authors find that mutuals employ more outside directors than stocks; firms that switch between stock and mutual characters make corresponding changes in board composition; mutuals' bylaws more frequently stipulate participation by outside directors; and mutuals with more outside directors make lower expenditures on salaries, wages, and rent. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.