SemperFi: Anti-spoofing GPS Receiver for UAVs
SemperFi: Anti-spoofing GPS Receiver for UAVs
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DOI：
10.14722/ndss.2022.23071
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发表时间：
2022
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Harshad Sathaye;Gerald LaMountain;P. Closas;Aanjhan Ranganathan
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文献类型：
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作者：
Harshad Sathaye;Gerald LaMountain;P. Closas;Aanjhan Ranganathan
众所周知，GPS容易受到信号欺骗攻击。虽然存在几种欺骗检测技术，但它们无法从隐形攻击者那里缓解和恢复。在这项工作中，我们提出了SemperFi，一个单天线GPS接收器能够跟踪合法的GPS卫星信号，并估计的真实位置，即使对强大的对手。我们的设计利用了基于扩展卡尔曼滤波器的GPS故障安全机制的组合，该机制内置于大多数无人机和定制设计的合法信号检索器模块中，以检测大多数欺骗攻击并自主恢复。我们开发算法来仔细合成恢复信号，并扩展连续干扰消除技术，以保留合法信号的ToA，同时消除攻击者的信号。对于能够进行隐形和无缝接管的强大对手，SemperFi使用旨在利用惯性传感器的短期稳定性并识别隐形欺骗攻击的简短机动。我们在GNSS-SDR（一种开源软件定义的GNSS接收机）中实施SemperFi，并使用无人机模拟器、真实的无人机、各种真实世界的GPS数据集以及各种嵌入式平台来评估其性能。我们的评估结果表明，在许多情况下，SemperFi可以通过执行小于100米长的飞行模式来识别敌对峰，并在0.54秒内恢复真实位置（Jetson Xavier）。我们表明，我们的接收器是安全的，对天真和隐身欺骗谁利用惯性传感器的错误和执行无缝接管攻击。此外，我们将SemperFi设计为一个可插拔模块，能够生成无欺骗的GPS信号，以便在当今任何商用现成GPS接收器上进行处理。最后，我们将我们的实现发布到社区供使用和进一步研究。
—It is well-known that GPS is vulnerable to signal spoofing attacks. Although several spoofing detection techniques exist, they are incapable of mitigation and recovery from stealthy attackers. In this work, we present SemperFi, a single antenna GPS receiver capable of tracking legitimate GPS satellite signals and estimating the true location even against strong adversaries. Our design leverages a combination of the Extended Kalman Filter based GPS failsafe mechanism built into majority of UAVs and a custom designed legitimate signal retriever module to detect and autonomously recover from majority of spoofing attacks. We develop algorithms to carefully synthesize recovery signals and extend the successive interference cancellation technique to preserve the legitimate signal’s ToA, while eliminating the attacker’s signal. For strong adversaries capable of stealthy and seamless takeover, SemperFi uses brief maneuvers designed to exploit the short-term stability of inertial sensors and identify stealthy spoofing attacks. We implement SemperFi in GNSS-SDR, an open-source software-defined GNSS receiver, and evaluate its performance using UAV simulators, real drones, a variety of real-world GPS datasets, as well as on various embedded platforms. Our evaluation results indicate that in many scenarios, SemperFi can identify adversarial peaks by executing flight patterns less than 100 m long and recover the true location within 0.54 s (Jetson Xavier). We show that our receiver is secure against both naive and stealthy spoofers who exploit inertial sensor errors and execute seamless takeover attacks. Furthermore, we design SemperFi as a pluggable module capable of generating a spoofer-free GPS signal for processing on any commercial-off-the-shelf GPS receiver available today. Finally, we release our implementation to the community for usage and further research.