To Have and to Hold

To Have and to Hold
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拥有和持有

DOI:
10.1111/phis.12107
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发表时间:
2017
影响因子:
0.7
通讯作者:
T. Von Solodkoff
T. Von Solodkoff
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
R. Woodward;T. Von Solodkoff

文献摘要

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至尊魔戒并不存在。但索伦伪造了它,比尔博和佛罗多都戴着它。就虚构的物体而言,它相当有名。但是,尽管人们很容易接受所有这些说法,但不难看出它们之间存在紧张关系。毕竟,如果至尊魔戒和索伦都不存在,那么前者怎么可能被后者锻造呢?有些东西必须要放弃。但是什么?数量惊人的哲学家认为,我们应该放弃本体论上的顾虑,接受至尊魔戒的存在。2这些哲学家认为,存在某种事物——虚构的物体——而虚构的戒指和虚构的佩戴者就是这种事物的例子。但这样说并不能说明什么,因为它没有回答关键问题。虚构的事物是抽象的还是具体的?必要的还是偶然的?它们是由作者创造的吗?接受虚构对象的真实性,接受虚构现实主义,并不能以某种方式回答这些问题。现实主义者可以用不同的方式来回答这些问题,现实主义的种类可以根据如何回答这些问题来划分。无论我们如何看待虚构现实主义的本体论结果,请注意,它们不能单独解决我们通常对虚构实体的思考和谈论中的紧张关系。考虑到这一点,根据最流行的虚构现实主义,虚构的实体是抽象的对象。根据这种观点,我们称之为伪现实主义,像魔戒这样的虚构实体不可能真的是在末日火山的火焰中锻造出来的,也不可能真的被一天吃六顿饭的小生物戴上。所以,即使至尊魔戒与索伦铸造的属性有某种重要关系,
The One Ring does not exist. But Sauron forged it, and Bilbo and Frodo both wore it. And as far as fictional objects go, it’s pretty famous. But though there is a strong temptation to accept all of these claims, it’s not hard to see that there are tensions between them. After all, if The One Ring and Sauron do not exist, then how can the former have been forged by the latter? Something has to give. But what? A surprising number of philosophers think we should give up our ontological scruples and embrace the existence of The One Ring. 2 Such philosophers think that there are things of a certain sort—fictional objects—and that fictional rings and their fictional bearers are examples of such things. But saying this isn’t saying very much because it leaves key questions unanswered. Are fictional things abstract objects or concrete ones? Necessary or contingent? Are they created by their authors or not? Accepting the reality of fictional objects and embracing fictional realism doesn’t commit one to answering these questions one way or the other. These are questions which realists can and do answer in different ways, and the species of realism can be demarcated in terms of how they are answered. Whatever we make of the ontological consequences of fictional realism, note that they cannot alone resolve the tensions in what we ordinarily think and say about fictional entities. Consider in this regard that according to the most popular species of fictional realism, fictional entities are abstract objects. On this view, which we call ersatz realism, fictional entities like The One Ring cannot really have been forged in the fires of Mt. Doom nor really worn by small creatures who eat six meals a day. 3 So even if The One Ring bears some important relation to the property of being forged by Sauron,