To Have and to Hold
To Have and to Hold
复制标题
拥有和持有
DOI:
10.1111/phis.12107
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发表时间:
2017
影响因子:
0.7
通讯作者:
T. Von Solodkoff
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
R. Woodward;T. Von Solodkoff
The One Ring does not exist. But Sauron forged it, and Bilbo and Frodo both wore it. And as far as fictional objects go, it’s pretty famous. But though there is a strong temptation to accept all of these claims, it’s not hard to see that there are tensions between them. After all, if The One Ring and Sauron do not exist, then how can the former have been forged by the latter? Something has to give. But what? A surprising number of philosophers think we should give up our ontological scruples and embrace the existence of The One Ring. 2 Such philosophers think that there are things of a certain sort—fictional objects—and that fictional rings and their fictional bearers are examples of such things. But saying this isn’t saying very much because it leaves key questions unanswered. Are fictional things abstract objects or concrete ones? Necessary or contingent? Are they created by their authors or not? Accepting the reality of fictional objects and embracing fictional realism doesn’t commit one to answering these questions one way or the other. These are questions which realists can and do answer in different ways, and the species of realism can be demarcated in terms of how they are answered. Whatever we make of the ontological consequences of fictional realism, note that they cannot alone resolve the tensions in what we ordinarily think and say about fictional entities. Consider in this regard that according to the most popular species of fictional realism, fictional entities are abstract objects. On this view, which we call ersatz realism, fictional entities like The One Ring cannot really have been forged in the fires of Mt. Doom nor really worn by small creatures who eat six meals a day. 3 So even if The One Ring bears some important relation to the property of being forged by Sauron,