Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents
Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents
复制标题
孔多塞陪审团定理对理性主体有益信息聚合的结果
DOI：
10.2307/2585673
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发表时间：
1998
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
A. McLennan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. McLennan
“ Naïve ”孔多塞定理自动有“复杂的”版本作为推论。孔多塞陪审团定理（Condorcet Jury Theorem）是一种结果，它与一种选举有关，在这种选举中，代理人有共同的偏好，但信息不同，它断言，平均而言，结果比任何特定个人选择的结果更好。有时还会有额外的断言，即随着人口的增长，做出错误决策的概率趋于零。作为共同利益博弈的简单属性的结果，只要“真诚的”投票导致定理的结论，就存在具有这些属性的纳什均衡。在对称环境中，均衡可以被认为是对称的。
“Naïve” Condorcet Jury Theorems automatically have “sophisticated” versions as corollaries. A Condorcet Jury Theorem is a result, pertaining to an election in which the agents have common preferences but diverse information, asserting that the outcome is better, on average, than the one that would be chosen by any particular individual. Sometimes there is the additional assertion that, as the population grows, the probability of an incorrect decision goes to zero. As a consequence of simple properties of common interest games, whenever “sincere” voting leads to the conclusions of the theorem, there are Nash equilibria with these properties. In symmetric environments the equilibria may be taken to be symmetric.