Opportunistic Accountability: State-Society Bargaining Over Shared Interests
Opportunistic Accountability: State-Society Bargaining Over Shared Interests
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DOI：
10.1177/0010414017720706
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发表时间：
2018-07-01
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Rosenzweig, Leah R.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Grossman, Shelby;Phillips, Jonathan;Rosenzweig, Leah R.
在国家和社会之间确定偏好是大多数问责机制的基础，因为它为社会向国家施加成本提供了一种可信的方式。适应一个经典的谈判框架，我们认为，更广泛的条件可以支持国家社会讨价还价。国家和社会都重视的政策也可以增强社会的谈判能力，前提是社会的估值相对较低，并且比国家更有耐心。通过威胁要破坏自己的利益，但更严重地伤害不耐烦的国家，公民可以迫使国家提供更广泛的政策利益。我们以尼日利亚北方的脊髓灰质炎疫苗接种为例来说明这一逻辑，在那里，整个社区都抵制疫苗接种，认为这是一种为更理想的服务讨价还价的策略。为了解决和预防违规行为，尼日利亚政府加强了其他领域的服务提供，这表明在利益共享政策存在的情况下，有机会改善问责制。
Conflicting preferences between the state and society underpin most accountability mechanisms by providing a credible way for society to impose costs on the state. Adapting a classic bargaining framework, we argue that broader conditions can support state-society bargaining. Policies that both the state and society value can also enhance society's negotiating power, provided society has a relatively lower valuation and is more patient than the state. By threatening to sabotage their own interests but hurt the impatient state even more, citizens can compel the state to deliver broader policy benefits. We illustrate this logic with the case of polio vaccination in northern Nigeria, where entire communities have resisted the vaccine as a strategy to bargain for more desired services. To resolve and preempt noncompliance, the Nigerian government has enhanced service delivery in other areas, demonstrating the opportunity for improved accountability in the presence of shared-interest policies.