A Vehicular DAA Scheme for Unlinkable ECDSA Pseudonyms in V2X
A Vehicular DAA Scheme for Unlinkable ECDSA Pseudonyms in V2X
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DOI：
10.1109/eurosp48549.2020.00036
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发表时间：
2020-09
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Christopher Hicks;Flavio D. Garcia
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Christopher Hicks;Flavio D. Garcia
V2X通信是一种广播消息系统，旨在提高联网和自动驾驶车辆的效率和安全性。在本文中，我们提出了一种新的V2X架构和密钥管理解决方案，该解决方案将直接匿名证明（DAA）的强大隐私保证与V2X所需的效率，低延迟和问责制相协调。与领先的V2X标准相比，在文献中是独一无二的，我们阻止了长期的车辆假名跟踪，尽管证书颁发机构不诚实和串通，同时保留了撤销的集中权力。我们的Vehicular DAA（VDAA）计划包括一个新的结构，通过将每个车辆限制为每个纪元一个匿名的密码请求来最佳地限制Sybil攻击。我们提出了一个新的安全模型VDAA，并表明，我们可以减少我们的椭圆曲线数字签名算法（ECDSA）广播消息的安全性的基础DAA计划的不可伪造性和不可链接性。
Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication is a broadcast messaging system intended to improve the efficiency and safety of connected and autonomous vehicles. In this paper we present a new V2X architecture and key management solution that reconciles the strong privacy guarantees of Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) with the efficiency, low-latency and accountability that is required for V2X. In contrast with the leading V2X standards, and uniquely in the literature, we prevent long-term vehicle pseudonym tracking despite dishonest and colluding certificate authorities and whilst retaining centralised authority over revocation. Our Vehicular DAA (VDAA) scheme includes a novel construction that optimally limits Sybil attacks by restricting each vehicle to one anonymous pseudonym-request per epoch. We present a new security model for VDAA and show that we can reduce the unforgeability and unlinkability of our Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) broadcast messages to the security of the underlying DAA scheme.