Can transitive inference evolve in animals playing the hawk-dove game?
Can transitive inference evolve in animals playing the hawk-dove game?
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DOI：
10.1016/s0022-5193(03)00059-6
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发表时间：
2003-06-21
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Sasaki, A
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Nakamaru, M;Sasaki, A
在与竞争对手争夺资源时，如果没有可靠的迹象表明竞争对手的实力，个人应该怎么办？在这里，我们研究了鹰鸽博弈中的进化稳定策略(ESS)，如果对手的资源持有潜力(RHP)只能间接地从种群中过去的相互作用的结果中推断出来。我们研究的策略包括经典的混合策略，其中没有利用过去游戏的信息；“印记”策略，即玩家在赢/输一场比赛时增加/减少其攻击性；“即时推理”策略，在该策略中，玩家可以推断以前与之战斗过的对手的实力；以及“传递推理”策略，在该策略中，玩家可以通过双方都曾与之战斗过的第三方来推断新对手的实力。对每对策略的不可渗透性分析表明：(I)传递性推理策略总是能够入侵混合策略和印记策略，并且本身拒绝这些策略的入侵；(Ii)传递性推理的最大优势是当一代人中每个人玩的游戏次数较少且输掉一场升级博弈的成本较大时；(Iii)如果战斗成本较小，即时推理而不是传递性推理可以是ESS；(Iv)在传递性推理策略师的群体中建立了一个强的线性排名，尽管它与实际RHP的排名不是完全相关的。我们发现，传递性推理的优势不在于它纠正错误评估的能力(实际上它在这样做方面是最糟糕的)，而在于它能够迅速将错误或正确的评估排列在一起，形成一个线性主导等级。(C)2003爱思唯尔科学有限公司。保留所有权利。
What should an individual do if there are no reliable cues to the strength of a competitor when fighting with it for resources? We herein examine the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the hawk-dove game, if the opponent's resource-holding potential (RHP) can only indirectly be inferred from the outcome of past interactions in the population. The strategies we examined include the classical mixed strategy in which no information on past games is utilized, the 'imprinting' strategy in which a player increases/decreases its aggressiveness if it wins/loses a game, the 'immediate inference' strategy in which a player can infer the strength of those opponents it fought before, and the 'transitive inference' strategy in which a player can infer the strength of a new opponent through a third party with which both players have fought before. Invasibility analysis for each pair of strategies revealed that (i) the transitive-inference strategy can always invade the mixed strategy and the imprinting strategy, and itself refuses invasion by these strategies; (ii) the largest advantage for transitive inference is achieved when the number of games played per individual in one generation is small and when the cost of losing an escalated game is large; (iii) the immediate inference, rather than the transitive inference, can be an ESS if the cost of fighting is small; (iv) a strong linear ranking is established in the population of transitive-inference strategists, though it does not perfectly correlate to the ranking by actual RHPs. We found that the advantage of the transitive inference is not in its ability to correct a misassessment (it is actually the worst in doing so), but in the ability of quickly lining up either incorrect or correct assessments to form a linear dominance hierarchy. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.