Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment
Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment
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脆弱的联盟：经济调整的政治
DOI：
10.1080/00213624.1991.11505214
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发表时间：
1991
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Dietz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Dietz
书评881一个不知情的，但事实证明，并非完全不受欢迎的国际后果的政策驱动的国内考虑。在最初阶段，调整对某些人，特别是受影响国家的权势精英来说，意味着相当正统的稳定计划;设想的政策变化是短期的，面向现状。强制性调整的紧缩政策将是短暂的，其成本将不成比例地向非精英倾斜。一旦危机时期过去，新的增长阶段就可能开始，利益再次集中在传统的精英决策者身上。然而，人们很快就清楚地看到，第三世界的现状稳定并不是第一世界在20世纪80年代所定义的新国际秩序（NIO）所要求的。尽管第三世界国家在20世纪70年代提出的NIEO（新国际经济秩序）从未在政策思想或行动上产生过显著的影响，但第一世界确保其NIO战略的力量尽管受到质疑，但显然更为成功。充分利用国际货币基金组织和世界银行提供的条件性控制杠杆，NIO实际上是关于重建OIO--第一世界鼓吹和第三世界游行的旧国际秩序--增长加债务战略威胁要破坏的秩序。第一世界希望从第三世界债务人那里得到的不是现有权力和生产结构的稳定，而是自由化，正如琼·纳尔逊富有洞察力的《概述》所言。传统的政策、传统的政治、传统的权力和生产结构都要改变，在某些情况下是相当大的改变。自由化（或一位撰稿人所称的”单一经济学”）意味着第三世界发展道路和议程的全新范式。统制主义、国家以及那些与以前的中央集权政策联系最紧密的阶级和利益集团都被淘汰了;市场、国际约束、新的阶级和热心的个人主义者准备承担风险，为所有人的利益而繁荣，成为真正和持久进步的时尚英雄。
Book Reviews 881 an unwitting but, as it turned out, not wholly undesirable international consequence of policies driven foremost by domestic considerations. Adjustment in its earliest stages meant to some, especially powerful elites in the effected countries, fairly orthodox stabilization schemes; envisaged changes in policy were short-run and status quo-oriented. The adjustment-mandated austerity SQueeze would be short-lived, and its costs would be skewed disproportionately toward non-elites. Once the crisis period was past, a new phase of growth could begin, with the benefits pitched once again toward the traditional elite decisionmakers. It soon became clear, however, that stabilization of the status quo ante in the Third World was not what was demanded in the new international order (NIO) as defined by the First World in the 1980s. Whereas the NIEO (New International Economic Order) proposed by the Third World nations in the 1970s never made a notable dent in policy thinking or action, the power of the First World to secure its NIO strategy, while contested, has been palpably more successful. Making full use of the conditionality levers of control available through the IMF and the World Bank, the NIO is really about reconstituting the OIO-the old international order in which the First World drummed and the Third marched-that the growth-cum-debt strategy had threatened to disrupt.What the First World wanted from the Third World debtors was not stabilization of existing power and productive structures but liberalization, as Joan Nelson's insightful Overview argues. Traditional policies, traditional politics and the traditional power and productive formations were to be altered, in some cases quite significantly. Liberalization (or" monoeconomics," as one contributor refers to it) implied a whole new paradigm for the path and agenda of development in the Third World. Dirigisme, the state, and those classes and interest groups most closely linked to former statist policies were out; the market, international constraints, and new classes and hearty individualists ready to take risks and prosper for the good of all became the fashionable heroes of true and lasting progress.