Selection pressure transforms the nature of social dilemmas in adaptive networks
Selection pressure transforms the nature of social dilemmas in adaptive networks
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DOI：
10.1088/1367-2630/13/1/013007
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发表时间：
2011
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
S. V. Segbroeck;F. C. Santos;T. Lenaerts;J. M. Pacheco
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. V. Segbroeck;F. C. Santos;T. Lenaerts;J. M. Pacheco
我们研究了结构化种群中合作的演化，其拓扑结构与个体的博弈策略协同演化。策略进化过程中，根据一个更新规则与一个自由的参数，这措施的选择压力。我们探讨这个参数如何影响网络动态和战略动态之间的相互作用。动态网络拓扑可以通过两种方式影响策略动态：（i）通过修改与每个策略相关的预期收益;（ii）通过重塑进化过程中的模仿网络。我们在这里表明，选择压力调谐这两种力量的相对贡献，战略演变的最终结果。模仿网络的动态在强选择下只起次要作用，但在弱选择下成为主导力量。我们展示了这些发现如何构成一个机制，支持合作行为。
We have studied the evolution of cooperation in structured populations whose topology coevolves with the game strategies of the individuals. Strategy evolution proceeds according to an update rule with a free parameter, which measures the selection pressure. We explore how this parameter affects the interplay between network dynamics and strategy dynamics. A dynamical network topology can influence the strategy dynamics in two ways: (i) by modifying the expected payoff associated with each strategy and (ii) by reshaping the imitation network that underlies the evolutionary process. We show here that the selection pressure tunes the relative contribution of each of these two forces to the final outcome of strategy evolution. The dynamics of the imitation network plays only a minor role under strong selection, but becomes the dominant force under weak selection. We demonstrate how these findings constitute a mechanism supporting cooperative behavior.