Kant's Conception of "Hume's Problem"
Kant's Conception of "Hume's Problem"
复制标题
康德的“休谟问题”构想
DOI：
10.1353/hph.1983.0051
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发表时间：
2008
影响因子：
0.7
通讯作者：
Manfred Kuehn
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Manfred Kuehn
1783 年，休谟的《人性论》问世四十四年，《人类理解论》问世三十五年后，一位名叫伊曼纽尔·康德的普鲁士哲学家发现有必要“公开承认”，“大卫·休谟的建议正是多年前第一次打断[他的]教条沉睡，并为[他的]思辨哲学领域的研究提供了一个全新的方向。”事实上，康德甚至将他当时备受争议的《纯粹理性批判》描述为“在最广泛的范围内解决休谟问题。”在做出这一坦白时，他似乎是在回应休谟，休谟在他的论文第一卷的结论中表示，他“唯一的希望”是他将“通过以下方式为知识的进步做出一点贡献”：
IN 1783, forty-four years after the appearance of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, and thirty-five years after that of his Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, a Prussian philosopher named Immanuel Kant found it necessary to "openly confess" that "the suggestion of David Hume was the very thing which many years ago first interrupted [his] dogmatic slumber and gave [his] investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction.'" In fact, Kant went so far as to characterize his then very controversial Critique of Pure Reason as "the execution of Hume's problem in its widest extent. ''~ In making this confession, he seems to be responding to Hume, who in the Conclusion of Book I of his Treatise expressed as his "only hope" that he would "contribute a little to the advancement of knowledge, by