Full Security of Quantum Key Distribution From No-Signaling Constraints
Full Security of Quantum Key Distribution From No-Signaling Constraints
复制标题
DOI：
10.1109/tit.2014.2329417
复制
发表时间：
2014-08-01
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
Barrett, Jonathan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Masanes, Lluis;Renner, Renato;Barrett, Jonathan
我们分析了一种加密协议，该协议用于根据违反贝尔不等式的相关性生成分布式密钥，并证明其针对窃听者的安全性，仅受以下假设的限制：他们可以访问的任何信息都必须与非信令原则兼容。该主张适用于密码学中使用的最先进的安全定义，即通用可组合安全性。非信令假设仅指根据测量选择对测量结果进行统计；因此，安全性独立于设备的内部运作——它们甚至不需要遵循量子理论定律。这与实践相关，因为对现实设备进行正确且完整的建模通常是不可能的。开发的技术是通用的，可以应用于其他基于贝尔不等式的协议。特别是，我们提供了一种当样本不独立且同分布时估计贝尔不等式违规的方案。
We analyze a cryptographic protocol for generating a distributed secret key from correlations that violate a Bell inequality by a sufficient amount, and prove its security against eavesdroppers, constrained only by the assumption that any information accessible to them must be compatible with the non-signaling principle. The claim holds with respect to the state-of-the-art security definition used in cryptography, known as universally-composable security. The non-signaling assumption only refers to the statistics of measurement outcomes depending on the choices of measurements; hence security is independent of the internal workings of the devices - they do not even need to follow the laws of quantum theory. This is relevant for practice as a correct and complete modeling of realistic devices is generally impossible. The techniques developed are general and can be applied to other Bell inequality-based protocols. In particular, we provide a scheme for estimating Bell-inequality violations when the samples are not independent and identically distributed.