Erratum: Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems [Phys. Rev. A74, 022313 (2006)]
Erratum: Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems [Phys. Rev. A74, 022313 (2006)]
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DOI：
10.1103/physreva.78.019905
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发表时间：
2008-07
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
V. Makarov;A. Anisimov;J. Skaar
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
V. Makarov;A. Anisimov;J. Skaar
我们建议一种针对量子密码系统的攻击，利用探测器效率的变化作为窃听者可访问的控制参数的函数。对于门控单光子探测器，这个控制参数可以是输入脉冲的定时。当窃听者使用适当的时间发送短脉冲，使Bob设置中的两个门控探测器具有不同的效率时，量子密钥分发的安全性就会受到损害。具体来说，我们展示了Bennett-Brassard 1984 （BB84）协议，如果0和1探测器之间的某些控制参数值的效率不匹配足够大（大约15:1或更大），Eve可以构建一个成功的伪造状态攻击，导致量子比特误码率低于11%。我们还推导了BB84协议的一般安全界作为检测器灵敏度不匹配的函数。给出了两种不同探测器的实验数据，并讨论了对这种攻击的防护措施。
We suggest a type of attack on quantum cryptosystems that exploits variations in detector efficiency as a function of a control parameter accessible to an eavesdropper. With gated single-photon detectors, this control parameter can be the timing of the incoming pulse. When the eavesdropper sends short pulses using the appropriate timing so that the two gated detectors in Bob’s setup have different efficiencies, the security of quantum key distribution can be compromised. Specifically, we show for the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol that if the efficiency mismatch between 0 and 1 detectors for some value of the control parameter gets large enough (roughly 15:1 or larger), Eve can construct a successful faked-states attack causing a quantum bit error rate lower than 11%. We also derive a general security bound as a function of the detector sensitivity mismatch for the BB84 protocol. Experimental data for two different detectors are presented, and protection measures against this attack are discussed.