The simultaneous, ascending auction: dynamics of price adjustment in experiments and in the UK3G spectrum auction
The simultaneous, ascending auction: dynamics of price adjustment in experiments and in the UK3G spectrum auction
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同步升序拍卖：实验和 UK3G 频谱拍卖中价格调整的动态
DOI：
10.1016/j.jebo.2003.01.003
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发表时间：
2004
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Timothy C. Salmon
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Plott;Timothy C. Salmon
基于两个原则：盈余最大化原则和竞价最小化原则，我们建立了同时递增拍卖中投标人的行为模型。这些原则导致了价格动态和均衡的模型，导致了可用于估计投标人价值的非均衡结构方程。发展这一方法的目的是为拍卖人提供一种在拍卖期间提取有关可能的收盘价的信息的方法。我们用来自实验性拍卖的数据对该模型的性能进行了基准测试，然后将其应用于英国的UMTS或第三代移动拍卖。
We develop a model of the behavior of bidders in simultaneous ascending auctions based on two principles: principle of surplus maximization and principle of bid minimization. These principles lead to models of both price dynamics and equilibration, leading to disequilibrium structural equations that can be used for estimating bidder values. The intention behind the development of this methodology is to provide an auctioneer a method of extracting information during an auction about possible closing prices. We benchmark the performance of the model with data from experimental auctions and then apply it to the UK UMTS or Third Generation Mobile Auction.