Financing decisions as a source of conflict in venture boards
Financing decisions as a source of conflict in venture boards
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融资决策是风险投资董事会冲突的根源
DOI：
10.1016/j.jbusvent.2009.03.001
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发表时间：
2010
影响因子：
8.7
通讯作者：
H. Sapienza
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Daniel P. Forbes;M. Korsgaard;H. Sapienza
治理学者建议，风险企业董事会的结构应该能够激发内部冲突。然而，结构是董事会有效性的弱预测。此外，冲突可能是功能失调的，特别是当它集中在关系而不是任务上时。我们发现，风险董事会经历更多的关系冲突时，他们作出融资决策，涉及贬值的风险，这种影响是缓和的CEO是否是一个创始人。我们的发现应该促使风险治理学者重新考虑董事会结构的重要性，董事会冲突的价值以及创始人与非创始人CEO的行为。
Governance scholarship has suggested that venture boards should be structured so as to stimulate internal conflict. However, structure is a weak predictor of board effectiveness. Moreover, conflict can be dysfunctional, especially when it is focused on relationships rather than tasks. We show that venture boards experience more relationship conflict when they make financing decisions that involve devaluation of the venture and that this effect is moderated by whether the CEO is a founder. Our findings should prompt venture governance scholars to reconsider the importance of board structure, the value of board conflict and the behavior of founder- versus non-founder CEOs.