Exit versus Voice

Exit versus Voice
复制标题

退出与语音

DOI:
--
复制
发表时间:
2022
影响因子:
8.2
通讯作者:
Luigi Zingales
Luigi Zingales
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Eleonora Broccardo;Oliver Hart;Luigi Zingales

文献摘要

参考文献

被引文献

相似文献

我们研究了在公司产生外部性和一些代理人关心其决策的社会影响的情况下,退出(撤资和抵制)和发声(参与)策略的相对有效性。我们的研究表明,如果大多数投资者都有哪怕一点点的社会责任,声音就会达到社会最优的结果。相反,除非每个人都对社会负有重大责任,否则退出就不会。如果大多数投资者是纯粹自私的,退出是一种更有效的策略,但这两种策略通常都不能达到最佳。我们还表明,退出有时会减少社会福利。
We study the relative effectiveness of exit (divestment and boycott) and voice (engagement) strategies in a world where companies generate externalities and some agents care about the social impact of their decisions. We show that if the majority of investors are even slightly socially responsible, voice achieves the socially optimal outcome. In contrast, exit does not unless everybody is significantly socially responsible. If the majority of investors are purely selfish, exit is a more effective strategy, but neither strategy generally achieves the first best. We also show that exit can sometimes reduce social welfare.
环境偏好与技术选择:市场竞争是干净的还是肮脏的?
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3569385
发表时间: 2020
期刊: SSRN Electronic Journal
影响因子: --
作者:
Aghion P
通讯作者: Aghion P