Coordination on Networks
Coordination on Networks
复制标题
网络协调
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3082671
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Junjie Zhou
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Leister;Y. Zenou;Junjie Zhou
我们研究了一个网络上的代理之间的协调博弈，选择是否采取行动，产生价值增加的邻居的行动。在一个标准的全局游戏设置中，玩家接收到技术的常见状态依赖值的噪声信息。证明了在无噪声极限下纯平衡点的存在唯一性。这种均衡将参与者划分为协调集，成员之间采取共同的截断策略，并且是路径连通的。我们推导出一个算法计算限制截止，并提供了必要和充分条件的代理居住在同一协调集。扰动的球员的底线值的战略影响被证明是遍布，但被包含在扰动球员的协调集。
We study a coordination game among agents on a network, choosing whether or not to take an action that yields value increasing in the actions of neighbors. In a standard global game setting, players receive noisy information of the technology's common state-dependent value. We show the existence and uniqueness of a pure equilibrium in the noiseless limit. This equilibrium partitions players into coordination sets, within members take a common cutoff strategy and are path connected. We derive an algorithm for calculating limiting cutoffs, and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for agents to inhabit the same coordination set. The strategic effects of perturbations to players' underlining values are shown to spread throughout but be contained within the perturbed players' coordination sets.
危机：均衡转移和大冲击
影响因子：
10.7
作者：
Morris, Stephen;Yildiz, Muhamet
通讯作者：
Yildiz, Muhamet