Policy options for the split incentive: Increasing energy efficiency for low-income renters.
Policy options for the split incentive: Increasing energy efficiency for low-income renters.
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DOI：
10.1016/j.enpol.2012.05.053
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发表时间：
2012-09-01
期刊：
影响因子：
9
通讯作者：
Hernández D
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bird S;Hernández D
激励分割问题涉及缺乏适当的激励措施来实施能源效率措施。特别是，低收入租户面临着能源贫困的现象，他们将家庭收入中用于能源支出的比例明显高于其他租户。这个问题很严重，影响了美国1.89%的能源使用。如果这一问题得到有效解决，每年将为美国许多最贫困的居民节省40亿至110亿美元。我们认为，一个精心设计的激励参与者（包括房东）的计划，结合一种独特的公用事业管理的账单融资机制，具有解决许多复杂问题的巨大潜力。我们专注于三种分裂激励，解决分裂激励问题固有的五个问题（规模，持久性，激励，储蓄，政治不受欢迎），并提供旨在超越这些问题的详细政策建议，特别关注美国背景下的低收入租户。
The split incentive problem concerns the lack of appropriate incentives to implement energy efficiency measures. In particular, low income tenants face a phenomenon of energy poverty in which they allocate significantly more of their household income to energy expenditures than other renters. This problem is substantial, affecting 1.89% of all United States' energy use. If effectively addressed, it would create a range of savings between 4 and 11 billion dollars per year for many of the nation's poorest residents. We argue that a carefully designed program of incentives for participants (including landlords) in conjunction with a unique type of utility-managed on-bill financing mechanism has significant potential to solve many of the complications. We focus on three kinds of split incentives, five concerns inherent to addressing split incentive problems (scale, endurance, incentives, savings, political disfavor), and provide a detailed policy proposal designed to surpass those problems, with a particular focus on low-income tenants in a U.S. context.