Common Knowledge , Coherent Uncertainties and Consensus
Common Knowledge , Coherent Uncertainties and Consensus
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常识,连贯的不确定性和共识
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发表时间：
2006
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通讯作者：
Y. Ben
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文献类型：
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作者：
Y. Ben
In this paper we study info-gap analogs of the classical game-theoretic concepts of informationand knowledge-functions, common knowledge and consensus. Our main results are that knowledge is constricted as info-gap-uncertainty grows (theorem 1), common knowledge is limited by the presence of info-gap uncertainty (theorem 2), and that common knowledge is related to consensus via the infogap coherence functions (theorem 3). We discuss several examples, including the prisoners’ dilemma, principal-agent contract negotiations, search and evasion strategies, and teamwork and the need for costly transfer of information.
