Endogenous Timing of Incentive Contracts in Mixed Markets Under Bertrand Competition
Endogenous Timing of Incentive Contracts in Mixed Markets Under Bertrand Competition
复制标题
伯特兰竞争下混合市场激励合约的内生时机
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9957.2011.02284.x
复制
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Juan Carlos Bárcena
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Juan Carlos Bárcena
本文分析了在Bertrand竞争下，企业所有者是否倾向于顺序或同时决定对经理人的激励契约。研究表明，在私人双寡头垄断市场中，如果一家企业是激励合同的领导者，另一家企业更愿意成为追随者，因此在均衡中，企业所有者顺序决定激励合同。然而，在一个混合双头垄断中，私人和公共企业都希望成为激励合同的领导者，因此在均衡中，企业同时做出决策。
In this paper we analyze whether owners of firms prefer to decide on incentive contracts for their managers sequentially or simultaneously under Bertrand competition. It is shown that, in a private duopoly, if one firm is the leader in incentive contracts the other firm prefers to be the follower and thus in equilibrium firms' owners decide incentive contracts sequentially. However, in a mixed duopoly both the private and the public firm want to be the leader in incentive contracts and thus in equilibrium firms make decisions simultaneously.