Central bank communication design in a Lucas-Phelps economy
Central bank communication design in a Lucas-Phelps economy
复制标题
卢卡斯-菲尔普斯经济中的中央银行沟通设计
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.01.003
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发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
C. Wallace
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
David P. Myatt;C. Wallace
在卢卡斯-菲尔普斯岛国经济中，一个岛国可以获得许多关于需求状况的信息信号。每个信号都包含公共和私人信息：׳S在整个经济中实现的一个信号的相关性决定了它的公开性。如果信息来源的公开性不同，那么价格形成过程和预期形成过程就会分开，导致产出缺口打开。稳定产出的央行更喜欢“平均公开”的信息，有时还会限制其政策声明的清晰度，以实现这一目标。银行׳S私下参与昂贵信息获取和传输的动机最强，不是因为最有影响力的信号，而是那些在价格和预期之间造成最大分歧的信号：远不是平均公开的信号。
In a Lucas-Phelps island economy, an island has access to many informative signals about demand conditions. Each signal incorporates both public and private information: the correlation of a signal׳s realizations across the economy determines its publicity. If information sources differ in their publicity then price-formation and expectations-formation processes separate, causing output gaps to open. An output-stabilizing central bank prefers “averagely public” information, and sometimes limits the clarity of its policy announcements to achieve this. The bank׳s incentive to engage privately in costly information acquisition and transmission is strongest not for the most influential signals, but instead for those which drive the largest wedge between prices and expectations: signals that are far from averagely public.