Ownership structure of nuclear power plants for fair competition and efficiency: private low-cost access versus public ownership
Ownership structure of nuclear power plants for fair competition and efficiency: private low-cost access versus public ownership
复制标题
公平竞争和效率的核电厂所有权结构：私人低成本接入与公有制
DOI：
10.1007/s42495-022-00104-6
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发表时间：
2022
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Yusuke and Takashi Yanagawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ikuta;Yusuke and Takashi Yanagawa
当零售电力市场放开时，现有公司相对于新进入者具有成本优势。这种情况损害了公平竞争。为了创造公平的竞争环境，进入者还应该能够获得低成本的发电机会。本文以电力行业为背景，研究如何利用分布不均的成本优势电厂。我们比较了两种情况。在第一种情况下，在位企业既拥有成本效率低的技术(如热电厂)，又拥有成本效率高的技术(如核电站)，它允许进入者获得成本效率低的技术，即私人低成本访问。第二种情况涉及引入一家旨在平衡收入和成本的上市公司，其中所有低成本发电厂都归上市公司所有，而不是现有的公司。第二种情况，即公有制，应该与第一种情况相比较，因为它似乎保证了现任和进入者有平等机会使用具有成本效益的发电厂。我们考虑的是一个双寡头市场的古诺型竞争。我们首先证明了公有制下的电力供应总量大于私人低成本接入下的电力供应总量。随后，我们发现，如果我们假设具有成本效益的发电厂的容量约束和固定成本，结果是相反的。最后，我们展示了在位者在必要时选择私人低成本访问而不是公有的条件。由于法国正在考虑从TOB到EDF，本文对EDF的国有化提供了一个分析的视角。
When the retail electricity market is liberalized, the incumbent firm has cost advantage over new entrants. This situation harms fair competition. To level the playing field, the entrant should also have access to low-cost generation. In this paper, we study how to utilize cost advantageous plant which is unevenly distributed in the context of electricity industry. We compare two scenarios. In the first scenario, the incumbent firm owns both the cost-inefficient technology (e.g., thermal power plants) and the cost-efficient technology (e.g., nuclear power plants), and it allows the entrant firm access to the cost-efficient one, namely private low-cost access. The second scenario involves introducing a public firm which aims to balance its revenue and cost, where all of low-cost power plants are owned by the public firm instead of the incumbent firm. The second scenario, namely public ownership, should be compared to the first one since it seems to assure that the incumbent and the entrant have equal access to the cost-efficient power plants. We consider a Cournot-type competition of a duopoly market. We first show that the total quantity of electricity supplied under public ownership is larger than that under private low-cost access. Subsequently, we reveal that the result is reversed if we assume capacity constraints and fixed costs for cost-efficient power plants. Finally, we show the condition wherein an incumbent chooses private low-cost access instead of public ownership if necessary. As TOB to EDF is being considered in France, this paper provides an analytical perspective on the nationalization of EDF.