Market-based control mechanisms for electric power demand response
Market-based control mechanisms for electric power demand response
复制标题
基于市场的电力需求响应控制机制
DOI：
10.1109/cdc.2010.5717572
复制
发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Daniel Greene
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Papavasiliou;H. Hindi;Daniel Greene
我们提出了一个结算机制，最佳调度真实的时间电力消耗，这是适合于一个自动化的需求响应控制系统。我们提出的结算机制，供应函数投标，被解释为一个牛顿算法的可分解结构的优化问题，它是满足福利经济学的第二个基本定理的仿射供应函数投标的情况下。我们模拟的行为，我们提出的控制机制的情况下，通过家庭温度控制的需求响应，我们演示了如何次优控制策略可以有不利的影响，无论是在系统性能和经济激励方面。
We propose a settlement mechanism for optimally scheduling real time electricity consumption which is suitable for an automated demand response control system. Our proposed settlement mechanism, supply function bidding, is interpreted as a Newton algorithm for optimization problems with decomposable structure, and it is shown to satisfy the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics for the case of affine supply function bids. We simulate the behavior of our proposed control mechanism for the case of demand response via home temperature control, and we demonstrate how a suboptimal control policy can have adverse impacts both in terms of system performance and also in terms of economic incentives.
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
KLEMPERER, PD;MEYER, MA
通讯作者：
MEYER, MA