SOCIAL IMAGE AND THE 50-50 NORM: A THEORETICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF AUDIENCE EFFECTS
SOCIAL IMAGE AND THE 50-50 NORM: A THEORETICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF AUDIENCE EFFECTS
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DOI：
10.3982/ecta7384
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发表时间：
2009-09-01
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Bernheim, B. Douglas
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Andreoni, James;Bernheim, B. Douglas
在广泛的经济环境中，50：50的标准似乎具有相当大的影响力。无论是在现实世界中还是在实验室中。即使在一方单方面决定奖金分配的情况下(独裁者游戏)。许多受试者自愿将恰好一半让给另一个人，人们关心公平的假设本身并不能解释关键的实验模式。我们认为：在另一种解释中，增加了人们喜欢撒谎的假设，认为它是公平的，因此信号博弈的均衡性质与实验室观察密切相关。这一理论还有其他可检验的含义，我们通过新的实验证实了它的有效性。
A norm of 50-50 division appears to have considerable force in a wide range of economic environments. both In the real world and in the laboratory. Even in settings where one party unilaterally determines the allocation of a prize (the dictator game). many subjects voluntarily cede exactly half to another individual The hypothesis that people care about fairness does not by itself account for key experimental patterns. We consider :in alternative explanation, which adds the hypothesis that people like to lie perceived its fair The properties of equilibria for the resulting signaling game correspond closely to laboratory observations. The theory has additional testable implications, the validity of which we confirm through new experiments