Weak feedbacks, governance mismatches, and the robustness of social-ecological systems: an analysis of the Southwest Nova Scotia lobster fishery with comparison to Maine
Weak feedbacks, governance mismatches, and the robustness of social-ecological systems: an analysis of the Southwest Nova Scotia lobster fishery with comparison to Maine
复制标题
反馈薄弱、治理不匹配和社会生态系统的稳健性：新斯科舍省西南部龙虾渔业与缅因州比较的分析
DOI：
10.5751/es-06714-190439
复制
发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
J. Anderies
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Barnett;J. Anderies
《治理公地》一书的见解为过去 23 年的公地研究提供了基础思想。然而，埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆分析的案例已经受到新的社会、经济和生态干扰。自20世纪80年代以来，这些案件发生了什么？我们重新评估了奥斯特罗姆的案例研究之一：新斯科舍省西南部 (SWNS) 拉梅伦港的龙虾和底层渔业。奥斯特罗姆表示，该渔业的自治很脆弱，因为政府不承认资源使用者组织自己规则的权利。然而，在缅因州龙虾渔业中，政府正式制定了习惯规则，并将权力下放给渔港。我们应用反馈、治理不匹配和社会生态系统稳健性的概念来理解拉梅伦港的制度变迁路径。我们利用从参与者观察、非正式访谈和调查以及有关 SWNS 和缅因州渔业政策和生态的文献中收集的海洋捕捞者的账户，重新审视了拉梅伦港的案例。我们发现，政府未能承认收割者组织的习惯权利，削弱了操作层面（资源使用者与资源互动）和集体选择层面（代理人制定规则来影响资源使用者的行为）之间的反馈。这导致了治理不匹配，导致收割者认为决策过程不利于他们的生计。因此，收割者很少参与决策并抵制监管变化。在缅因州，收割者可以通过参与影响决策，但需要权衡取舍。由于船长对决策的影响力更大，因此他们可以选择决策过程。尽管如此，我们认为，由于反馈比缅因州更弱，SWNS 的渔业更容易受到社会生态变化的影响。最后，我们讨论了多中心对两种渔业的潜在好处。
The insights in Governing the Commons have provided foundational ideas for commons research in the past 23 years. However, the cases that Elinor Ostrom analyzed have been exposed to new social, economic, and ecological disturbances. What has happened to these cases since the 1980s? We reevaluated one of Ostrom's case studies, the lobster and groundfishery of Port Lameron, Southwest Nova Scotia (SWNS). Ostrom suggested that the self-governance of this fishery was fragile because the government did not recognize the rights of resource users to organize their own rules. In the Maine lobster fishery, however, the government formalized customary rules and decentralized power to fishing ports. We applied the concepts of feedback, governance mismatches, and the robustness of social-ecological systems to understand the pathway of institutional change in Port Lameron. We revisited the case of Port Lameron using marine harvesters' accounts collected from participant observation, informal interviews and surveys, and literature on fisheries policy and ecology in SWNS and Maine. We found that the government's failure to recognize the customary rights of harvesters to organize has weakened feedback between the operational level, where resource users interact with the resource, and the collective-choice level, where agents develop rules to influence the behavior of resource users. This has precipitated governance mismatches, which have led harvesters to believe that the decision-making process is detrimental to their livelihoods. Thus, harvesters rarely participate in decision making and resist regulatory change. In Maine, harvesters can influence decisions through participation, but there is a trade-off. With higher influence in decisions, captains have co-opted the decision-making process. Nevertheless, we suggest that the fisheries of SWNS are more vulnerable to social-ecological change because of weaker feedbacks than in Maine. Finally, we have discussed the potential benefits of polycentricity to both fisheries.