Hide and Seek: Waveform Emulation Attack and Defense in Cross-Technology Communication
Hide and Seek: Waveform Emulation Attack and Defense in Cross-Technology Communication
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DOI：
10.1109/icdcs.2019.00114
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发表时间：
2019-07
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Xiaonan Zhang;Pei Huang;Linke Guo;Yuguang Fang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Xiaonan Zhang;Pei Huang;Linke Guo;Yuguang Fang
异构物联网（IoT）设备数量呈指数级增长，导致本已拥挤的ISM频段出现严重的频谱短缺和干扰。跨技术通信（CTC）致力于实现具有不同无线电和调制方案的无线设备之间的直接通信，这是解决上述挑战的有效方法。然而，CTC也为对手提供了操纵物联网设备的机会。在本文中，我们确定了一种新的攻击。基于CTC的WiFi设备能够将预先截获的ZigBee消息隐藏在其发送的波形中，从而达到直接控制ZigBee设备的目的。为了抵御攻击，我们分析了可能的策略，并考虑星座高阶统计分析作为对策。大量的模拟和实验与商品设备（CC26x2R1）和基于USRP的原型显示了新识别的攻击的存在，并进一步验证了所提出的防御方法的有效性。
The exponentially increasing number of heterogeneous Internet of Things (IoT) devices result in severe spectrum shortage and interference in the already crowded ISM band. Cross-Technology Communication (CTC) is dedicated to achieving direct communication among wireless devices with different radios and modulation schemes, which serves as an effective approach to address the above challenges. Nevertheless, CTC also provides opportunities for adversaries to manipulate IoT devices. In this paper, we identify a new attack. Built on CTC, WiFi devices are able to hide the pre-intercepted ZigBee message into their transmitted waveforms, achieving the objective of directly controlling ZigBee devices. To defend against the attack, we analyze possible strategies and consider constellation higher-order statistic analysis as the countermeasure. Extensive simulations and experiments with commodity devices (CC26x2R1) and USRP-based prototypes show the existence of the newly identified attack, and further, validate the effectiveness of the proposed defensive approach.