Bertrand vs. Cournot Competition with Upstream Firm Investment
Bertrand vs. Cournot Competition with Upstream Firm Investment
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伯特兰与古诺与上游公司投资的竞争
DOI：
10.1111/boer.12067
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
0.8
通讯作者：
Dongjoon Lee and Kangsik Choi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
成生達彦;鈴木浩孝;DongJoon Lee and Kangsik Choi;Dongjoon Lee and Kangsik Choi
本文比较了贝特朗和古诺竞争的垂直结构中，上游企业设置的投入价格和R&D投资。从下游企业的角度来看，古诺竞争的优势在于垄断效应更强，从而导致价格更高，但劣势在于上游企业的投资动机较低。另一方面，Bertrand竞争的优点是为上游公司提供了更大的投资激励，但缺点是竞争效果更强，导致设定较低的价格。我们的主要发现如下。第一，贝特朗竞争下的R&D投资水平大于古诺竞争下的R&D投资水平。第二，从上游企业和产业的角度来看，贝特朗竞争比古诺竞争更有效率。第三，从下游企业的角度来看，当投资充分有效和产品充分差异化时，贝特朗竞争比古诺竞争更有效。
This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot competition in a vertical structure in which the upstream firm sets the input price and makes R&D investments. We show that from the downstream firms’ point of view, Cournot competition has the advantage of a more monopolistic effect, leading to the setting of a higher price, but has the disadvantage of inducing a lower incentive for the upstream firm to invest. On the other hand, Bertrand competition has the advantage of providing a greater incentive for the upstream firm to invest but has the disadvantage of a more competitive effect, leading to the setting of a lower price. Our main findings are as follows. First, R&D investment level is greater under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. Second, from the standpoint of the upstream firm and industry, Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition. Third, from the standpoint of the downstream firms, Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot when investment is sufficiently efficient and products are sufficiently differentiated.