Bayesian Monotonicity with Side Payments
Bayesian Monotonicity with Side Payments
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侧支付的贝叶斯单调性
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1993.1007
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发表时间：
1993
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Hitoshi Matsushima
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hitoshi Matsushima
摘要本文研究了带边支付的贝叶斯纳什实现。众所周知，贝叶斯单调性和自我选择对于完全实现是必要和充分的。我们引入了一个容易验证的条件，条件1，这是等价于严格的自我选择下的贝叶斯单调性。我们还引入了一个信息条件称为不一致欺骗条件，这是充分的条件1。然后，我们表明，不一致的欺骗条件是非常弱的，并得出结论，贝叶斯单调性一般成立。这与众所周知的完全信息环境的负面结果相反。此外，我们将虚拟实现扩展到贝叶斯环境。经济文献分类号：025，026。
Abstract We investigate Bayesian Nash implementation with side payments. It is familiar that Bayesian monotonicity, together with self selection is necessary and sufficient for full implementation. We introduce an easily verifiable condition, Condition 1, which is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity under strict self selection. We also introduce an informational condition called the no-consistent-deception condition, which is sufficient for Condition 1. We then show that the no-consistent-deception condition is very weak and conclude that Bayesian monotonicity holds generically. This is in contrast to the well-known negative result for complete information environments. Moreover, we extend virtual implementation to Bayesian environments. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 025, 026.