One-Round Protocol for Two-Party Verifier-Based Password-Authenticated Key Exchange
One-Round Protocol for Two-Party Verifier-Based Password-Authenticated Key Exchange
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DOI：
10.1007/11909033_8
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发表时间：
2006-10
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Kwon;K. Sakurai;Dong Hoon Lee
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Kwon;K. Sakurai;Dong Hoon Lee
Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) for two-party allows a client and a server communicating over a public network to share a session key using a human-memorable passwordonly. PAKE protocols can be served as basic building blocks for constructing secure, complex, and higher-level protocols which were initially built upon the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. In this paper, we propose a provably-secureverifier-basedPAKE protocol well suited with the TLS protocol which requires only a single round. The protocol is secure against attacks using compromised server’s password file and known-key attacks, and provides forward secrecy, which is analyzed in the ideal hash model. This scheme matches the most efficient verifier-based PAKE protocol among those found in the literature. It is the first provably-secureone-roundprotocol for verifier-based PAKE in the two-party setting.
