Information Verifiability, Bank Organization, Bank Competition and Bank-Borrower Relationships
Information Verifiability, Bank Organization, Bank Competition and Bank-Borrower Relationships
复制标题
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.926975
复制
发表时间：
2006-02
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Masaji Kano;H. Uchida;Gregory F. Udell;W. Watanabe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Masaji Kano;H. Uchida;Gregory F. Udell;W. Watanabe
本文考察了银行-借款人关系的收益是否取决于理论文献中确定的三个因素：信息的可验证性、银行的规模和复杂性以及银行的竞争。我们扩展了当前的文献，在一个同时解释了这三个因素的经验模型中，分析了关系贷款如何影响贷款合同条款和信贷可获得性。此外，我们独特的日本中小企业数据集使我们能够首次使用微型公司数据来检查在制定贷款合同条款时以经审计的财务报表形式进行信息可验证性的价值。我们发现，当公司没有经过审计的财务报表时，以及在竞争较弱的市场上从小银行借款时，公司从银行-借款人关系中受益最大，这与一些不同的理论研究是一致的。
This paper investigates whether the benefits of bank-borrower relationships differ depending on three factors identified in the theoretical literature: verifiability of information, bank size and complexity, and bank competition. We extend the current literature by analyzing how relationship lending affects loan contract terms and credit availability in an empirical model that simultaneously accounts for all three of these factors. Also, our unique data set of Japanese SMEs allows us to examine for the first time using micro firm data the value of information verifiability in the form of audited financial statements in setting loan contract terms. We find that firms benefit most from bank-borrower relationships when they do not have audited financial statements and when they borrow from small banks in less competitive markets, which is consistent with a number of different theoretical studies.