The Welfare Effects of Vertical Integration in Multichannel Television Markets
The Welfare Effects of Vertical Integration in Multichannel Television Markets
复制标题
多频道电视市场垂直整合的福利效应
DOI：
10.5167/uzh-120872
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Ali Yurukoglu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gregory S. Crawford;Robin S. Lee;M. Whinston;Ali Yurukoglu
我们研究了美国多频道电视市场中区域体育网络（rsn）与节目分销商垂直整合的福利效应。垂直整合可以通过减少双重边缘化和增加渠道运输来提高效率，但也可能由于丧失抵押品赎回权和提高竞争对手的成本激励而损害福利。我们使用美国有线电视和卫星电视行业（2000-2010年）的丰富数据集估算了收视率、订阅、分销商定价和联盟费用讨价还价的结构模型。我们使用这些估计来分析模拟垂直合并和拆分rsn对竞争和福利的影响，并检查美国联邦通信委员会为解决该行业竞争问题而引入的监管政策的有效性。
We investigate the welfare effects of vertical integration of regional sports networks (RSNs) with programming distributors in U.S. multichannel television markets. Vertical integration can enhance efficiency by reducing double marginalization and increasing carriage of channels, but can also harm welfare due to foreclosure and raising rivals' costs incentives. We estimate a structural model of viewership, subscription, distributor pricing, and affiliate fee bargaining using a rich dataset on the U.S. cable and satellite television industry (2000-2010). We use these estimates to analyze the impact of simulated vertical mergers and de-mergers of RSNs on competition and welfare, and examine the efficacy of regulatory policies introduced by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission to address competition concerns in this industry.