The basic notion of justification
The basic notion of justification
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理由的基本概念
DOI：
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发表时间：
1990
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Christopher Menzel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Kvanvig;Christopher Menzel
结论我们的任务至此完成。我们提供了，在J7，一个可辩护的主张，有一个doxastic和命题的理由之间的必要性和充分性的关系。我们还主张命题证明是证明的基本类型。为了捍卫这一主张，开展了几项工作。首先，初步的调查表明，最多有三种不可约的理由。为了表明只有一种，我们首先展示了个人称义是如何等同于doxastic理由。然后，我们表明，虽然doxastic理由可以定义在命题的理由，命题的理由不能定义在那种doxastic理由预言的令牌的信念。这些结果对认识论的实质和建构认识论理论的方法论都有启示。首先，没有一个版本的可靠性可以辩护声称，有根本不同的和不可约的概念的理由。此外，通过这些版本的可靠性，作为实例计数阿斯特丽德认识论的程序不可能是正确的。这种理论开始讨论我们的智力，院系，美德，或认知过程，然后定义一个原始的概念，理由在doxastic产品的权力，院系，美德，或过程。这种方法不能成功，因为，正如我们所看到的，没有这样的理论可以给予doxastic和命题的理由之间的连接充分的解释。要使这些理论成功，必须有三种选择之一。第一，命题的理由是可以解释的doxastic理由;正如我们所看到的，这种说法是错误的。第二个和第三个选择是，阿斯特丽德要么可能声称命题和doxastic理由之间的irreductionary，或者可能认为，出于某种原因或其他，没有这样的事情作为命题的理由。由于J7的兼容性，这两种替代方案都没有吸引力。如果它是足够的，那么doxastic理由是在命题理由方面可解释的。此外，如果J7是足够的，声称没有这样的事情作为命题的理由把doxastic理由的概念处于危险之中，以及，为doxastic理由是可以定义的命题理由。总而言之：目前的可靠主义理论认为，理由是我们的认知设备的结果，从而致力于构建一个理论的理由与doxastic理由作为基本概念的理由，是不相容的事实，命题的理由是基本类型的理由。
ConclusionOur tasks are then complete. We offered, in J7, a defensible claim that there is a relation of necessity and sufficiency between doxastic and propositional justification. We claimed as well that propositional justification is the basic kind of justification. In order to defend this claim, several tasks were undertaken. First, a preliminary investigation showed that there are at most three irreducible kinds of justification. In order to show that there is only one kind, we first showed how personal justification is equivalent to doxastic justification. We then showed that, whereas doxastic justification can be defined in terms of propositional justification, propositional justification cannot be defined in terms of that kind of doxastic justification predicable of tokens of beliefs. We conclude that propositional justification is the basic kinds of justification.These results have implications both for the substance of epistemology and for the methodology employed in constructing an epistemological theory. First, no version of reliabilism can be defended by claiming that there are fundamentally distinct and irreducible notions of justification. Further, the procedure adopted by those versions of reliabilism which count as instances of Aristotelian epistemology cannot be correct. Such theories begin by discussing our intellectual powers, faculties, virtues, or cognitive processes and then define a primitive notion of justification in terms of the doxastic products of such powers, faculties, virtues, or processes. This approach cannot succeed, for, as we have seen, no such theory can given an adequate explanation of the connection between doxastic and propositional justification. For these theories to succeed, one of three alternatives must be available. The first is that propositional justification is explicable in terms of doxastic justification; as we have seen, that claim is false. The second and third alternatives are that Aristotelians either might claim irreducibility between propositional and doxastic justification, or the might hold that, for some reason or other, there is no such thing as propositional justification. Both of these alternatives are unattractive because of the plausibility of J7. If it is adequate, then doxastic justification is explicable in terms of propositional justification. Further, if J7 is adequate, claiming that there is no such thing as propositional justification puts the notion of doxastic justification in jeopardy as well, for doxastic justification is definable in terms of propositional justification. In sum: present reliabilist theories which hold that justification is the result of the proper employment of our cognitive equipment, and which are thereby committed to constructing a theory of justification with doxastic justification as the basic notion of justification, are incompatible with the fact that propositional justification is the basic kind of justification.