Three-Party ORAM for Secure Computation
Three-Party ORAM for Secure Computation
复制标题
用于安全计算的三方 ORAM
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-662-48797-6_16
复制
发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Boyang Wei
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sky Faber;Stanislaw Jarecki;S. Kentros;Boyang Wei
An Oblivious RAM ORAM protocol [13] allows a client to retrieve $${\mathrm {N}}$$-th element of a data array $${\mathsf {D}}$$ stored by the server s.t. the server learns no information about $${\mathrm {N}}$$. A related notion is that of an ORAM for Secure Computation SC-ORAM [17], which is a protocol that securely implements a RAM functionality, i.e.i¾? given a secret-sharing of both $${\mathsf {D}}$$ and $${\mathrm {N}}$$, it computes a secret-sharing of $${\mathsf {D}}[{\mathrm {N}}]$$. SC-ORAM can be used as a subprotocol for implementing the RAM functionality for secure computation of RAM programs [7, 14, 17]. It can also implement a public database service which hides each client's access pattern even if a threshold of servers colludes with any number of clients.
Most previous works used two-party secure computation to implement each step of an ORAM client algorithm, but since secure computation of many functions becomes easier in the three-party honest-majority setting than in the two-party setting, it is natural to ask if the cost of an SC-ORAM scheme can be reduced if one was willing to use three servers instead of two and assumed an honest majority. We show a 3-party SC-ORAM scheme which is based on a variant of the Binary Tree Client-Server ORAM of Shi et al. [20]. However, whereas previous SC-ORAM implementations used general 2PC or MPC techniques like Yao's garbled circuits, e.g. [14, 22], homomorphic encryption [11], or the SPDZ protocol for arithmetic circuits [15], our techniques are custom-made for the three-party setting, giving rise to a protocol which is secure against honest-but-curious faults using bandwidth and CPU costs which are comparable to those of the underlying Client-Server ORAM.
An Oblivious RAM ORAM protocol [13] allows a client to retrieve $${\mathrm {N}}$$-th element of a data array $${\mathsf {D}}$$ stored by the server s.t. the server learns no information about $${\mathrm {N}}$$. A related notion is that of an ORAM for Secure Computation SC-ORAM [17], which is a protocol that securely implements a RAM functionality, i.e.i¾? given a secret-sharing of both $${\mathsf {D}}$$ and $${\mathrm {N}}$$, it computes a secret-sharing of $${\mathsf {D}}[{\mathrm {N}}]$$. SC-ORAM can be used as a subprotocol for implementing the RAM functionality for secure computation of RAM programs [7, 14, 17]. It can also implement a public database service which hides each client's access pattern even if a threshold of servers colludes with any number of clients.
Most previous works used two-party secure computation to implement each step of an ORAM client algorithm, but since secure computation of many functions becomes easier in the three-party honest-majority setting than in the two-party setting, it is natural to ask if the cost of an SC-ORAM scheme can be reduced if one was willing to use three servers instead of two and assumed an honest majority. We show a 3-party SC-ORAM scheme which is based on a variant of the Binary Tree Client-Server ORAM of Shi et al. [20]. However, whereas previous SC-ORAM implementations used general 2PC or MPC techniques like Yao's garbled circuits, e.g. [14, 22], homomorphic encryption [11], or the SPDZ protocol for arithmetic circuits [15], our techniques are custom-made for the three-party setting, giving rise to a protocol which is secure against honest-but-curious faults using bandwidth and CPU costs which are comparable to those of the underlying Client-Server ORAM.