Essentialist beliefs about social categories
Essentialist beliefs about social categories
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DOI：
10.1348/014466600164363
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发表时间：
2000-03-01
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
Ernst, D
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Haslam, N;Rothschild, L;Ernst, D
这项研究考察了关于社会类别本体论地位的信念，询问其成员是否被理解为具有共同的固定的、固有的本质或本性。根据本质主义的九个要素对四十个社会类别进行了评级。这些元素形成了两个独立的维度，分别代表了类别被理解为自然类型和具有内在核心（“实体性”或具体化）的连贯实体的程度。具体化与类别的评价状态负相关，尤其是在那些被理解为自然类别的类别中。本质主义不是社会信仰的单一综合症，也不是与贬值和偏见整体相关的，但它阐明了社会分类的几个方面。
This study examines beliefs about the ontological status of social categories, asking whether their members are understood to share fixed, inhering essences or natures. Forty social categories were rated on nine elements of essentialism. These elements formed two independent dimensions, representing the degrees to which categories are understood as natural kinds and as coherent entities with inhering cores ('entitativity' or reification), respectively. Reification was negatively associated with categories' evaluative status, especially among those categories understood to be natural kinds. Essentialism is not a unitary syndrome of social beliefs, and is not monolithically associated with devaluation and prejudice, but it illuminates several aspects of social categorization.