Regulation, customer protection and customer engagement
Regulation, customer protection and customer engagement
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监管、客户保护和客户参与
DOI：
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Littlechild
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Littlechild
英国在1980年代发展的公用事业规管架构，旨在改善美国限制性、低效率和繁琐的规管方法。但英国的监管程序本身现在也变得越来越繁重。与此同时，美国和加拿大的公用事业公司和客户团体已经开发出了谈判和解决监管问题的方法，这些方法更直接地反映了客户的利益，通常体现了英国的激励价格上限，并避免了过度繁琐的监管程序。英国监管机构现在有向海外学习的空间。本文总结了这些发展。然后，它研究了三个英国公用事业监管机构-CAA，Ofgem和Ofwat -是如何回应他们。简而言之，CAA已经坚定地朝着这个方向前进，但Ofgem和Ofwat名义上拒绝了它，同时试图通过一个不那么坚定的过程来确保这种方法的许多好处。各国政府可以鼓励采取一种监管办法，为客户提供更好的结果的前景，并为所有相关方提供一个不那么繁琐的过程。
The UK utility regulation framework developed in the 1980s was intended to improve on the restrictive, inefficient and burdensome regulatory approach in the US. But the UK regulatory process has itself now become increasingly burdensome. Meanwhile, utilities and customer groups in the US and Canada have developed methods of negotiating and settling regulatory issues that more directly reflect the interests of customers, often embody incentive price caps as in the UK, and avoid unduly burdensome regulatory processes. There is now scope for UK regulators to learn from overseas. This paper summarises these developments. It then examines how three UK utility regulators – the CAA, Ofgem and Ofwat - are responding to them. Briefly, the CAA has moved firmly in this direction, but Ofgem and Ofwat have nominally rejected it while seeking to secure many of the benefits of the approach via a less committed process. There is scope for governments to encourage a regulatory approach that offers the prospect of better outcomes for customers and a less onerous process for all concerned.