Market Discounts and Shareholder Gains for Placing Equity Privately
Market Discounts and Shareholder Gains for Placing Equity Privately
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04723.x
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发表时间：
1993-06
影响因子：
8
通讯作者：
M. Hertzel;Richard L. Smith
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Hertzel;Richard L. Smith
尽管以相当大的折扣出售，但私募股权与正的异常回报有关。作者发现的证据表明，折扣反映了私人投资者承担的信息成本和异常回报反映了有利的信息，公司价值。研究结果与Myers和Majluf（1984）提出的私募配售解决投资不足问题的作用以及私募配售信号被低估的作用是一致的。作者还发现了一些证据，表明私人出售股权可带来预期的监督效益。对于样本中的小公司来说，信息效应似乎比所有权效应相对更重要。版权所有1993年美国金融协会。
Despite selling at substantial discounts, private placements of equity are associated with positive abnormal returns. The authors find evidence that discounts reflect information costs borne by private investors and abnormal returns reflect favorable information about firm value. Results are consistent with the role of private placements as a solution to the Myers and Majluf (1984) underinvestment problem and with the use of private placements to signal undervaluation. The authors also find some evidence of anticipated monitoring benefits from private sales of equity. For the smaller firms that comprise their sample, information effects appear to be relatively more important than ownership effects. Copyright 1993 by American Finance Association.