A context-aware scheme for privacy-preserving location-based services

A context-aware scheme for privacy-preserving location-based services
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DOI:
10.1016/j.comnet.2012.03.022
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发表时间:
2012-07-31
期刊:
影响因子:
5.6
通讯作者:
Zhao, Wei
Zhao, Wei
中科院分区:
计算机科学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Pingley, Aniket;Yu, Wei;Zhao, Wei

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我们解决与基于位置的服务 (LBS) 中的隐私保护相关的问题。大多数现有的隐私保护 LBS 技术要么需要可信的第三方(匿名器),要么使用计算和通信成本高昂的加密协议。我们的隐私保护技术设计的原则是不需要可信的第三方,同时在时间和空间复杂性方面保持高效。该问题有两个有趣且具有挑战性的特征:首先,隐私保护程度和 LBS 准确性取决于用户位置周围的环境,例如人口和道路密度。其次,攻击者可能通过两种方式侵犯用户的位置隐私:(i) 基于 LBS 查询负载中包含的用户位置信息;(ii) 基于设备的 IP 地址推断用户的地理位置。为了应对这些挑战,我们引入了 CAP,这是一种上下文感知的隐私保护 LBS 系统,具有数据隐私和通信匿名的集成保护。我们实施了 CAP 并将其与流行的 LBS 系统 Google 地图集成。理论分析和实验结果验证了CAP在隐私保护方面的有效性。 LBS 准确性和通信 QoS(服务质量)。 (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. 保留所有权利。
We address issues related to privacy protection in location-based services (LBSs). Most existing privacy-preserving LBS techniques either require a trusted third-party (anonymizer) or use cryptographic protocols that are computationally and communicationally expensive. Our design of privacy-preserving techniques is principled on not requiring a trusted third-party while being highly efficient in terms of time and space complexities. The problem has two interesting and challenging characteristics: First, the degree of privacy protection and LBS accuracy depends on the context, such as population and road density, around a user's location. Second, an adversary may violate a user's location privacy in two ways: (i) based on the user's location information contained in the LBS query payload and (ii) by inferring a user's geographical location based on the device's IP address. To address these challenges, we introduce CAP, a context-aware privacy-preserving LBS system with integrated protection for both data privacy and communication anonymity. We have implemented CAP and integrated it with Google Maps, a popular LBS system. Theoretical analysis and experimental results validate CAP's effectiveness on privacy protection. LBS accuracy, and communication QoS (Quality-of-Service). (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.