Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies
Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies
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DOI：
10.1093/restud/rdab016
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发表时间：
2021-03
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Daniel Clark;D. Fudenberg;A. Wolitzky
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Daniel Clark;D. Fudenberg;A. Wolitzky
我们引入了一个新的模型，在随机匹配、世代重叠、过去博弈记录有限的大种群中进行重复博弈。我们证明了在一般条件下，稳态均衡是存在的。当球员记录的更新可以依赖于比赛中双方的行为时，任何严格的个人理性行为都可以在稳态均衡中得到支持。当记录更新只能依赖于玩家自己的动作时，可以支持的动作更少。在这里，我们关注囚犯困境，并将注意力限制在严格的均衡上，这些均衡是不能协调的，这意味着匹配的伙伴永远不会在由他们的记录和预期的持续收益引起的一次博弈中玩帕累托主导的纳什均衡。如果阶段博弈是“严格的超模和温和的”或“强烈的超模”，这样的均衡可以支持完全合作，否则根本不允许合作。“超级合作”记录的存在，即玩家在对抗任何对手的情况下进行合作，对于在舞台游戏“严峻”的情况下支持任何合作至关重要。
We introduce a new model of repeated games in large populations with random matching, overlapping generations, and limited records of past play. We prove that steady-state equilibria exist under general conditions on records. When the updating of a player’s record can depend on the actions of both players in a match, any strictly individually rational action can be supported in a steady-state equilibrium. When record updates can depend only on a player’s own actions, fewer actions can be supported. Here, we focus on the prisoner’s dilemma and restrict attention to strict equilibria that are coordination-proof, meaning that matched partners never play a Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game induced by their records and expected continuation payoffs. Such equilibria can support full cooperation if the stage game is either “strictly supermodular and mild” or “strongly supermodular,” and otherwise permit no cooperation at all. The presence of “supercooperator” records, where a player cooperates against any opponent, is crucial for supporting any cooperation when the stage game is “severe.”